Democratic Renewal in Fragmental Communities:  The Northern Ireland Case by Knox, Colin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic Renewal in Fragmental Communities:  
The Northern Ireland Case 
 
Colin Knox 
 
Local Governance: 29(1): 2003, 14-36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact details: 
Colin Knox 
School of Policy Studies 
University of Ulster 
Shore Road 
Jordanstown 
Northern Ireland 
BT 37 OQB 
Email: cg.knox@ulster.ac.uk 
Telephone: 028 90366378/366667 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Northern Ireland is perhaps the locus extremis of fragmental communities in the 
United Kingdom. The ethno-national tensions and political violence that have ravaged 
the Province for over 30 years continue unabated at a number of interface areas where 
single identity Catholic and Protestant communities live cheek by jowl. Intimidation, 
threats, rioting and naked sectarianism in the form of pickets mounted to protest 
against Catholic primary school children walking through ‘a Protestant estate’ (the so 
called 'Holy Cross' dispute) testify to increasing territorialism and community 
segregation. All of this continues despite the historic constitutional settlement in the 
form of the Belfast Agreement in which signatories affirmed their ‘total and absolute 
commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences 
on political issues, and opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any 
political purpose’ (Belfast Agreement, 1998: 1).  This demonstrates, however, that the 
long-term ‘cohesive, inclusive and just society’ promised in the constitutional 
agreement cannot be delivered solely through a consensus amongst the political elite 
at Stormont, but must be grounded in work undertaken within communities who must 
endorse and see the tangible benefits of the peace dividend. Residents of North 
Belfast, for example, would need much convincing that the Belfast Agreement has 
delivered peaceful community co-existence
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. 
 
This paper examines local governance and the role of the active community in the 
democratic renewal of Northern Ireland. It considers this in 3 phases. The first phase 
(1921–1972) might be described as a period of disrepute, during which local 
government was discredited as an elected forum and used to consolidate Unionist 
hegemony. The second phase could be styled the emasculation of local government 
and the emergence of a strong voluntary and community sector to fill the vacuum left 
by the democratic deficit of Direct Rule from Westminster (1972-1999). The final and 
current phase might be characterised as a period of democratic renewal (1999 
onwards) or what Carmichael (1999) has described as ‘devolution-plus’. This period 
involves a twin track approach. One element includes a review of public 
administration arrangements in Northern Ireland incorporating local government, 
quangos and agencies (but importantly not the 11 government departments). The 
second element has three aims: firstly, to develop more formal arrangements with the 
voluntary and community sector in the decision making processes of government 
departments; secondly, the institutionalisation of social partnership through the Civic 
Forum, established under the Belfast Agreement; and finally, the emergence of local 
partnership arrangements in a number of important functional areas (health, 
community safety and ‘well-being’). The dilemma facing Members of the Legislative 
Assembly, who have been bereft of electoral power for nearly 30 years, is how to 
balance the need to involve an active community alongside rebuilding a local 
democratic base. This poses particular questions about the future role of local 
government in Northern Ireland under a reformed system of public administration. 
The fact that these three temporal phases correspond to key political milestones in the 
political chronology of Northern Ireland should not be surprising. The focus of this 
                                                          
1
 The terms 'community' or 'two communities' in Northern Ireland present conceptual difficulties of 
interpretation. Although a convenient short-hand, the descriptions suggest homogeneity which does not 
exist in practice. The Catholic 'community' includes Nationalists and Republicans. Unionists are much 
more factional, particularly the various guises of paramilitary Loyalists. These terms also ignore people 
from ethnic minority groups in Northern Ireland, for example, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani. 
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paper will necessarily be on the final phase although a short summary of the first two 
stages should provide a context for discussions which follow. 
 
Disrepute and emasculation 
 
Local government in Northern Ireland is the product of the Local Government 
(Ireland) Act 1898 which created an administrative framework similar to Great 
Britain at the time – a two-tier system of county councils and urban & rural district 
councils, and in the case of the six largest towns, county boroughs. Birrell and Murie 
note that local government was ‘based on the somewhat dubious assumption that the 
system devised for nineteenth-century England was also appropriate for Ireland’ 
(Birrell and Murie, 1980: 155). This structure remained in place at the time of the 
establishment of the Irish Free State and devolved government in Northern Ireland 
following the Government of Ireland Act 1920. With devolution, Unionists 
consolidated their majority status in a number of ways, particularly through local 
government. The 1922 Local Government (Northern Ireland) Act replaced 
proportional representation by majority voting, redrew electoral boundaries and 
altered the franchise by incorporating property ownership as a qualification for the 
vote (O’Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, 1980). As a result, local government became 
an instrument of Unionist ascendancy. The limited nature of the franchise, 
gerrymandering of electoral boundaries and discrimination in service provision 
(particularly housing allocation for political advantage) ensured Unionist dominance.  
In short, local government was discredited as a political forum although it survived 
unscathed until the late 1960's. 
 
Criticisms of local government were a core tenet of the civil rights protests in 1968. 
At the same time, the Stormont Government considered proposals for reform on the 
grounds that many councils were neither administratively or financially viable. In 
1969, housing was removed as a local government function and a review body set up 
to examine the distribution of functions at central and local levels. The ensuing 
Macrory Report stripped local government of its key functions, proposed district 
councils with minor powers, and envisaged a regional tier of administration with 
substantial public services responsible to the Northern Ireland Parliament. The pace of 
political development, civil unrest and the prorogation of Stormont superseded the 
process of reform and prospects of a regional government disappeared with the 
introduction of Direct Rule from Westminster. The British Government proceeded 
with Macrory’s suggestions for local government in the form of the Local 
Government (Northern Ireland) Act 1972, but responsibility for regional services 
rested with British ministers working through the Northern Ireland Office. The 
outcome was the emasculated local government structure which exists today. There 
are 26 single tier district councils responsible for a limited range of local services 
(largely – refuse collection and disposal, leisure and community services, street 
cleaning, environment and building control). Total council spending in 2001/2002 
amounted to £291m out of a devolved government budget of £5.9b, or 4.9% of the 
public expenditure in Northern Ireland (Department of the Environment, 2002). 
Councillors have a representative role on services provided by central government, 
such as education boards and the fire service. They must also be consulted about local 
planning, housing and roads by government departments which are directly 
responsible for their provision (largely the Department for Regional Development, 
Department for Social Development and the Department of the Environment).   
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In a discussion of local government in Great Britain, Wilson and Game argue that 
‘there has always been a tension between local authorities’ service and political 
functions – between their role as service deliverers and a potentially much wider role 
as the elected governments of their particular areas and communities’. They suggest 
that ‘the whole organisation and operation of local authorities have been driven by 
their service-providing responsibilities’ (Wilson and Game, 2002: 366). Given the 
small scale and functional unimportance of local government in Northern Ireland, the 
opposite is true. In the absence of a regionally elected forum (save for the short-lived 
Northern Ireland Assembly of 1982-86), council chambers became the political forum 
for constitutional debates which had nothing to do with their executive functions. The 
election of Sinn Féin to councils in 1985, for example, was anathema to Unionists 
who demanded their proscription. Unionists’ tactics, such as excluding Sinn Féin 
from committees and preventing them from speaking at council meetings resulted in 
numerous, sometimes violent, disturbances. Republicans mounted a successful legal 
challenge against this ploy. The Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 ushered in a new 
wave of protest in councils. Unionist controlled councils adopted a policy of 
adjourning all meetings and refusing to strike a district rate. They argued that to 
administer local government was to give tacit support to the London-Dublin inspired 
Agreement. Once again this was successfully challenged in the courts and the protest 
withered away to an inauspicious end. 
 
Direct Rule therefore witnessed the demise of local government and the absence of 
political accountability for public services. British ministers had no local electoral 
base and were preoccupied with constitutional and security matters – this vested 
significant powers in the hands of civil servants who paid scant regard to local 
councillors. This democratic deficit stirred the first signs of self-help in the 
community. A number of community action groups emerged in response to the 
trauma of political violence but without government support. As Nolan described it: 
 
 All over Northern Ireland there were people trying to help the families that 
had been burnt out, or establishing food co-operatives, or taking kids from the 
frontline areas off on holiday, or setting up peoples’ assemblies, or trying to 
get dialogue going between Catholics and Protestants. There was prodigious 
energy, and an optimism that this ragbag of people could create a sort of 
counter-culture that would not only challenge the rising sectarianism, but 
would give expression to a new radical politics (Nolan, 2000: 29). 
 
Increasingly, Northern Ireland Office ministers and senior civil servants recognised 
the contribution which these groups could make to a wide spectrum of government 
programmes in health and social services, urban renewal, economic development, 
poverty initiatives and, most importantly, community relations. This, in turn, led to a 
more professionalised voluntary and community sector that worked with, and 
accepted more resources from, government in the eighties and was well placed to 
support efforts to build a peace process in the nineties. Self-help and community 
activism, however, were more evident in Nationalist areas whose history reinforced 
the state as Unionist oppressor. Fearon (2000: 26) observes that 'groups were more 
likely to be found in areas of high economic deprivation and Nationalist in hue. 
Unionist groups still saw community development as a rebellious activity, something 
that sought to subvert and undermine the state'. By 1993, the Government published a 
Strategy for the Support of the Voluntary Sector and for Community Development in 
Northern Ireland which stressed the importance of partnership arrangements with the 
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voluntary sector and acknowledged in particular the role of community groups in 
helping to formulate social policies. The development of civil society from its origins 
of grassroots community activism and volunteerism was described thus:  
 
In comparison with the 1970's, the funding and policy environment for the 
voluntary and community sector is unrecognisable. The sector has 
demonstrated maturity and effectiveness in helping to tackle social and 
economic needs and in fostering peace and reconciliation. This element of 
civil society in Northern Ireland has been pivotal in keeping hope alive in very 
difficult circumstances (Sweeney, 1997: 61). 
 
In summary, the first period of devolution in Northern Ireland (1921–72) witnessed 
local government discredited as a political entity and its emergence as a denuded 
forum with limited executive powers. The political vacuum and sectarian violence 
during Direct Rule mobilised community activists in a new phase, largely 
characterised by self-help (1972-99). Increasingly the voluntary and community 
sector became valued by government as potential partners in the formulation and 
delivery of social policies. As various attempts to break the constitutional impasse 
foundered, the voluntary and community sector became a stronger stakeholder. This 
was their status as they entered the next phase, described here as democratic renewal 
(1999 – onwards). 
 
Democratic renewal 
 
‘Democratic renewal’ is seen as a core element in the series of reforms which 
constitute the Labour Government’s modernisation agenda. This wider modernising 
brief asserts that ‘government matters’ – its role should be to improve the quality of 
our lives through the provision of policies, programmes and services.  ‘People want 
effective government, both where it responds directly to their needs (health, 
education, social services)… and where it acts for society as a whole (environment, 
crime)’ (Cabinet Office, 1999:10). Specifically, democratic renewal refers to a 
number of measures required if councils are to respond to, and provide leadership for, 
local communities. These include modernising local electoral arrangements, listening 
to and involving people in the decision-making process, developing clearer political 
management structures and strengthening councils as leaders of their local 
communities (DETR, 1998: 2.3).  
 
An emphasis on these specific measures to address democratic renewal is, however, 
considered limiting. Pratchett (1999), for example, defines democratic renewal in 
three ways: 
 A set of practical responses to clearly identifiable problems with local democracy 
(as described in the modernising agenda). 
 More systemic failings in the practice of local democracy and attempts to instigate 
broader political, cultural and constitutional change across society. This will 
necessarily question our understanding of the role and purpose of local 
government and the nature of democracy as a core component of modern 
government. 
 Normative proposals for a new mode of democracy in which different components 
of representative, deliberative and direct democracy are combined to create a more 
open, participative and responsive polity at the local level (Pratchett, 1999:2) 
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This offers a useful benchmarking framework for examining the progress of 
democratic renewal in Northern Ireland. Has renewal, for example, meant the 
implementation of specific measures to address problems with local democracy or a 
more radical response? 
 
Considering initiatives to address the failings in existing democratic practice first, the 
‘visionary leadership’ role which these changes are intended to produce has limited 
‘read across’ to local government in Northern Ireland. For example, council elections 
are held under the PR (STV) voting system and turnout at the 2001 local government 
elections was 68%. Accepting that all elections in Northern Ireland are significantly 
influenced by the constitutional agenda, there is no evidence of the voter apathy 
experienced in Great Britain where local elections produce turnouts of less than 40%. 
Similarly, there is no appetite for changes leading to new political management 
structures. The prospect of a directly elected Mayor would only lead to divisive 
sectarian voting (witnessed in the election of Northern Ireland’s 3 Members of the 
European Parliament) and harden public opinion around councils perceived as 
Nationalist, Republican, Unionist or Loyalist controlled. This would do little to assist 
the process of involving citizens in the decision making process and would more 
likely alienate minority communities in council areas. Moreover, changing political 
management structures has the potential to negate what is prosaically referred to as 
‘responsibility sharing’ arrangements that operate in local councils. From the late 
1980's, a number of councils have been engaged in ‘power-sharing’ (Unionists object 
to this pejorative descriptor) where mayors and council chairs rotate between political 
parties and committee chairs are selected on a proportional basis. This practice is now 
widespread in all but the most hard-line councils. In 2002/03, eighteen councils are 
currently operating some form of power-sharing arrangements. Inter-party 
collaboration at the local government level heralded similar provisions contained in 
the Belfast Agreement. The power-sharing arrangements in the Stormont Assembly 
formalised what had been happening in local government for some years, but without 
the fanfare.  
 
One of the core components of democratic renewal, however, community leadership 
and the promotion of well-being, has particular significance for local government in 
the Province. The new discretionary power for principal local authorities in England 
and Wales ‘to do anything they consider likely to promote the economic, social or 
environmental well-being of their area’ under Part I of the Local Government Act 
2000 does not apply to Northern Ireland (DETR, 2001(a): 4). Although there is no 
definition of what actions constitute the promotion of well-being, guidance to local 
authorities highlights the need for an integrated approach to tackling social exclusion, 
reducing health inequalities, promoting neighbourhood renewal and improving local 
environmental quality. Given the absence of key functional responsibilities for 
councils in Northern Ireland, this power has even greater significance if local 
authorities are to have oversight of the many central government and quango service 
providers in their areas. Has modernisation and the democratic renewal agenda 
therefore by passed Northern Ireland? 
 
The most obvious manifestation of the Labour Government’s modernisation agenda in 
Northern Ireland was the devolution of power to the elected Assembly with full 
legislative and executive authority in December 1999. A cross-community Executive 
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of Ministers presides over 11 departments responsible for key public service 
functions. Statutory committees, constituted using the proportional d’Hondt system, 
have a statutory, policy development and consultation role in relation to the 
departments and can initiate legislation (Osborne, 2002). The democratic renewal 
strategy adapted for Northern Ireland amounts to two core components contained 
within the Executive’s first Programme for Government. The first is a comprehensive 
review of public administration, key to which is relocating public services within an 
accountable and democratic framework, following years of Direct Rule 
(representative democracy). The second is a series of measures to strengthen 
participative democracy by building on the involvement of the voluntary and 
community sector. These are considered in turn. 
 
Reforming the public sector - representative democracy 
 
The review of public administration was first heralded in the Programme for 
Government as follows: 
 
 We have inherited from the last 30 years a wide range of public bodies. Their 
organisation and structure reflected the needs of those times. They helped 
maintain services at a time of very limited public accountability. But now that 
devolution has been achieved, there is a need for change that will provide not 
only greater accountability, but should ensure that organisations that deliver 
many key services throughout Northern Ireland are more coherently organised. 
It is therefore important that we set about a major process of reform in central 
government (Northern Ireland Executive Programme for Government, 2001: 
7.1.1). 
 
The central theme of the review, launched in June 2002, is, according to the First 
Minister ‘to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system of public 
administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services to citizens’ 
(Trimble, 2002). The prevailing argument is that Northern Ireland has moved from a 
position of ‘democratic deficit’ to surfeit mode, with 18 Westminster MPs, 108 
members of the legislative assembly, 582 councillors and 3 MEPs, all for a population 
of 1.6m people. Aside from considerations of political representation, the focus is on 
ways to rationalise public service provision as the Assembly struggles (without the 
benefit of tax-raising powers) to meet the ever increasing demands of public service 
provision. They have inherited a system of non-departmental public bodies 
responsible for major functions such as health, education and housing which consume 
half of their devolved budget (£6.1b in 2002/03). To satisfy the exigencies of a power-
sharing executive, the Assembly has superimposed a cumbersome system of 11 
government departments (to replace six). This complex mosaic now represents the 
structure of public administration in Northern Ireland (Knox, 1999). In short, the 
Province appears both over-governed and over-administered. 
 
Democratic renewal is therefore central to reforming a system of public 
administration whose principal functions are controlled by appointees in non-
departmental public bodies. Whilst this satisfied the requirements of Direct Rule 
government and allowed British ministers to dispense patronage to compliant 
selectees, this is now regarded by local politicians as unacceptable under devolution. 
What is significant, however, is that the 11 central government departments have been 
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ruled out of the review’s remit. There is an oblique reference to examining the 
functions of central government as opposed to departmental structures. In other 
words, the review is likely to have implications for functions exercised by the 
Executive, but the institutions established by the Belfast Agreement and the division 
of functions between 11 government departments will not be part of the review’s 
remit. Caution is being exercised lest anti-Agreement parties highjack the review to 
unpick the Belfast Agreement by the back door.  
 
With government departments now outside the review, attention is focussed on 
reforming local government. Although the review team, led by officials from the 
Office of the Minister and Deputy First Minister (and advised by a panel of 
independent experts), must have regard for principles such as democratic 
accountability, community responsiveness, subsidiarity, efficiency and effectiveness 
and the scope of the public sector (in the review’s terms of reference), the process 
could become highly politicised. Speculation about reducing the number of councils 
has politicians already redrawing notional political boundaries to ensure Unionist or 
Nationalist strongholds under any reconfigured structural arrangements. Unionists in 
particular, wary of an inexorable drift towards a United Ireland, are keen to establish 
political clusters in the event of any future constitutional change. Not that Northern 
Ireland has a monopoly on discounting considerations of administrative rationality in 
undertaking reforms. Observers of local government reform in Scotland and Wales in 
1995/1996 pointed out  that ‘local government reorganisations in the United Kingdom 
have not been undertaken on the basis of any comprehensive theories of structural 
change. Instead, policy makers have worked on the basis of a few vague ideas which 
owe more to political sloganising than policy strategies. Conceptual links between 
structure and performance are not well developed’ (Boyne, Jordan and McVicar 
(1995: 79).   
 
The democratic renewal agenda in Northern Ireland has therefore a different emphasis 
than the rest of the United Kingdom. Clearly there are the more obvious democratic 
deficiencies associated with the legacy of Direct Rule, notably the emasculation of 
local government and proliferation of non-departmental public bodies. The review of 
public administration is charged with tackling these deficiencies. More 
fundamentally, however, democratic renewal is ‘an agenda for new politics that seeks 
to redefine the relationship between the citizen and the state through the renovation of 
political institutions and processes at central and community levels’ (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1999: 33). In Northern Ireland this will not be achieved solely through 
structural changes in the architecture of public administration. The relationship 
between citizen and state is problematic. The British State is perceived by Nationalists 
as the guarantor of Unionist demands to remain part of the United Kingdom, and by 
Republicans as repressive and complicit in this political goal. The Belfast Agreement 
and its legal enactment in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, although reaffirming the 
status of the Province as part of the United Kingdom based on the principle of 
consent, allows for a United Ireland, should the majority vote for this option. This, 
along with the human rights and equality provisions in the Agreement, has created a 
new confidence amongst Nationalists and Republicans in the political institutions.  
 
It is possible to undertake an ‘audit’ of democratic renewal, drawing on data from the 
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2001. This is a probability sample of 1,800 
adults (age 18 or over) carried out via face-to-face interviews to monitor the attitudes 
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and behaviour of people in Northern Ireland on a range of issues (education, political 
attitudes, health issues, community relations and social networks). From these data a 
number of observations can be made about the status of democratic renewal: 
 
 There is a high level of democratic engagement if measured by the barometer of 
electoral participation - turnouts at the 2001 Local Government and Westminster 
elections were 67.9% and 68.6% respectively. 
 Patterns of traditional voting remain firmly entrenched in Northern Ireland (see 
table 1 - appendix 1). There is a need to find ways to actively engage people 
beyond the confines of orange/green issues which will make those elected more 
responsive and accountable for public services. Attempts to do this include 
parallel measures to strengthen participative democracy. 
 Given the absence of significant executive powers in local government, 
participation can only be to reaffirm ethno-national cleavages on constitutional 
issues. People do not feel empowered at the local government level (see table 2 - 
appendix 1). 
 Devolved institutions have created a new but differentiated electoral 
empowerment with signs of alienation amongst the Protestant population (see 
table 3 - appendix 1).  
 
Having considered the first component of democratic renewal - devolved government 
and its efforts to create more accountable public services, we now turn to the second 
element of renewal – participative democracy. 
 
Participative democracy 
 
What makes the potential reform of local government highly speculative is the role 
now ascribed by the Northern Ireland Executive to other social partners, in particular 
the voluntary and community sector under devolved government arrangements. Here 
again the Programme for Government sets out the Executive’s vision: 
 
Regeneration of our society – in the fullest sense means that we have to tackle 
issues of equality and human rights, poverty and social disadvantage, renewal 
of the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods, sustaining and enhancing local 
communities and improving community relations… In tackling these issues 
we have the advantage of a vibrant and extensive community and voluntary 
sector which already makes significant and critical contributions to many areas 
of life. A key challenge will be to build on this community capacity and to 
involve it in policies and programmes aimed at strengthening our community 
well-being (Northern Ireland Executive Programme for Government, 2001: 
2.1.1). 
 
Three examples which testify to the involvement of an active community in 
democratic renewal are the Executive’s efforts at formally engaging with the 
voluntary and community sector, the establishment and working of the Civic Forum, 
and the sector’s role in the evolving local strategy partnerships. 
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Engaging the Voluntary and Community Sector  
 
The pre-existing working relationship between the voluntary sector and senior 
officials under Direct Rule had been instrumental in the production of the 1993 
Strategy for the Support of the Voluntary Sector and for Community Development in 
Northern Ireland. This, in turn, helped lay the foundations for developing a ‘compact’ 
or a framework to guide relationships between Government and the sector
2
. Compacts 
evolved from the recommendations of the Deakin Commission (The Commission on 
the Future of the Voluntary Sector, 1996) and the policy document Building the 
Future Together (1997) published by the Labour Party in opposition. The Deakin 
Commission proposed a ‘concordat’ of principles to inform the relationship between 
Government and the sector. The Labour Government adapted these proposals in the 
form of compacts. Hence, Northern Ireland (as in England, Scotland and Wales) 
formally launched its compact Building Real Partnership (1998). The aims of this 
compact are to clarify respective roles in the relationship between Government and 
the voluntary and community sector, establish shared values and principles that 
underpin the partnership, and identify commitments to ensure these values and 
principles govern future relationships (Northern Ireland Office, 1998: 8).  
 
In reviewing the substance of compacts throughout the United Kingdom, Morison 
(2000: 113) whilst acknowledging that they represented an important statement about 
a new relationship, argued that ‘they appear as genuinely baffling documents and 
seem to be made up of mainly warm words, platitudes and generalities’. The Northern 
Ireland Office however, was not at all confounded. It viewed the compact as a 
partnership with the voluntary and community sector based on shared values and 
mutual respect working with Government ‘to identify and tackle social needs, 
strengthen communities, and build a more tolerant, participative, inclusive and 
peaceful society’ (Northern Ireland Office, 1998: 4). A Joint Government/Voluntary 
and Community Sector Forum was set up following the publication of the compact to 
discuss issues of mutual interest and to monitor its operation in practice. The forum 
comprises officials from each government department and fifteen representatives 
from the voluntary and community sector. However, the compact’s timing (December 
1998) was such that it remained in abeyance until devolution happened one year later, 
and as the Programme for Government (quoted above) made clear, the new 
administration not only embraced the spirit of the compact but also sought to 
operationalise it.  
 
The Department for Social Development’s Voluntary and Community Unit3 launched 
its strategy document Partners for Change (2001 - in draft form) for the voluntary and 
community sector in Northern Ireland. The 3-year strategy sets out specific priorities 
and actions which all government departments will take to enable the voluntary and 
                                                          
2
 There are 4,500 - 5,000 voluntary organisations in Northern Ireland. The voluntary and community 
sector paid workforce numbered 29,168 in 2001, accounting for 4.5% of the Northern Ireland 
workforce. The gross income for the voluntary and community sector in the financial year 2000/01 was 
£657.1m and total current expenditure £640.8m. Source: State of the Sector III (2002). Belfast: 
Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action. 
3
 The Department for Social Development changed the name of its Voluntary Activity Unit to the 
Voluntary and Community Unit in May 2002. This signalled a shift in emphasis in the work of the Unit 
which now assumes lead responsibility for voluntary and community sector development across 
government and promotes inter-departmental debate on key issues in the field with a particular focus 
on addressing social need and social exclusion. 
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community sector ‘to contribute more fully to their areas of business and subsequently 
the social, environmental and cultural life of Northern Ireland’ (Department for Social 
Development, 2001: 9).  There are also responsibilities on the voluntary and 
community sector to take actions to support the implementation of the strategy. Each 
government department describes its current relationship with the voluntary and 
community sector in the strategy and then sets out its priorities and actions under 3 
broad headings: capacity building, working together and resourcing the sector.  
Considering just one of these headings – ‘Working Together’ – illustrates the extent 
of engagement envisaged between Government and the sector: 
 
Working together will entail 3 dimensions: 
 Working together to ensure that the voluntary and community sector are actively 
involved, and afforded the opportunity to contribute to the development, 
implementation and monitoring of policy developments in order that their 
expertise might inform policy making processes. 
 Working together to share good practice, to build on the experience of 
Government and the sector, in addressing need and effecting change and to 
develop and maintain mechanisms enabling greater communication between 
Government and the sector. 
 Working together to deliver services. 
(Department for Social Development, 2001: 15) 
 
Although this is a Government strategy it was developed collaboratively with the 
Joint Government/Voluntary and Community Sector Forum. Each department will 
prepare an annual progress report on the Partners for Change strategy which the 
Minister must endorse prior to its submission for consideration by the Joint Forum. 
The strategy will also be independently evaluated after 3 years. 
 
Partners for Change undoubtedly gives a very firm commitment to collaborative 
working between the devolved administration and the voluntary and community 
sector. This compares with local compact partnerships in England where researchers 
have found ‘a gap between language and action… The voluntary sector may be 
spoken of as an 'essential' but is then not mentioned in corporate plans, and is not 
involved in strategic planning’ (Gaster and Deakin, 1998: 191).  The language used 
by the Department for Social Development to describe the Northern Ireland strategy is 
bold by any standards – ‘with over 5,000 voluntary and community groups in 
Northern Ireland, creation of this strategy is an ambitious and innovative exercise that 
is without precedent in the United Kingdom’ (Department for Social Development, 
2001: 10). The Voluntary and Community Unit (within the Department for Social 
Development) describes how the voluntary and community sector has become a key 
social partner in the processes of government. That involvement, it argues, ‘reflects a 
more developed and mature relationship and role within Government than anywhere 
else in the United Kingdom, Ireland or indeed Europe’ (Voluntary and Community 
Unit, 2002: 1).  Even after stripping away the departmental rhetoric, the strategy 
suggests a significant role for the voluntary and community sector in the decision-
making process of every government department. Its strict monitoring arrangements, 
overseen by the Joint Forum which will scrutinise annual progress reports that must 
be signed-off by ministers, implies departments cannot afford to pay lip-service to 
partnering the sector. The co-chair of the Joint Forum commented: 
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 Five years ago it was almost inconceivable that representatives from 
government departments would be meeting regularly with representatives of 
community groups and voluntary organisations to discuss issues of concern in 
a Joint Forum. The most significant area that has engaged the Joint Forum 
over the past two years has been the development of the Government’s 
strategy to support the community and voluntary sector – Partners for 
Change. This is a unique document. It is the first time that a devolved 
administration in the United Kingdom has published a document that brings 
together departmental strategies for the support of the community and 
voluntary sector. It is unique in the way in which it has brought together 
representatives from the community and voluntary sector and departmental 
officials in jointly working to develop the strategy. It is unique in the way in 
which the ongoing monitoring arrangements for the strategy will include the 
community and voluntary sector (Graham, 2002: 20). 
 
Perhaps because of the extent of the voluntary and community sector’s involvement at 
central government level and the paucity of local authorities’ powers in Northern 
Ireland, there has not been the development of local compact arrangements as in other 
parts of the United Kingdom (Craig et al, 1999; Ross and Osborne, 1999). But there 
are important general lessons to be learned from that experience. Osborne and 
McLaughlin (2002), for example, chart the relationships between local government 
and the voluntary sector in England between 1979-2000 and examine the 
implementation of compacts at both national and local levels. They conclude that the 
voluntary sector compact ‘has the potential to give substance to the rhetoric of 
community governance, by providing explicit processes for the community to impact 
upon policy formulation and service management at the local level’ (Osborne and 
McLaughlin, 2002: 61). They highlight, however, some of the attendant threats - 
potential participative challenges to the tradition of representative democracy, and the 
loss of voluntary sector independence as an advocate for the marginalised and socially 
excluded through its incorporation into the machinery of the state. These threats are 
all the more real given the size of Northern Ireland, the scale of the voluntary and 
community sector and its close working relationship with senior officials. 
 
The Civic Forum 
 
Another example of the potential role played by an active community in democratic 
renewal is the Civic Forum in Northern Ireland. The Forum was established under the 
terms of the Belfast Agreement as a ‘consultative mechanism on social, economic and 
cultural issues’ (Belfast Agreement, 1998: 9). Beyond this, the Agreement is not 
specific, other than to say that it will receive administrative support from the Office of 
the First and Deputy First Minister. It comprises representatives of the business, trade 
union and voluntary sectors and ‘such other sectors as agreed’ by the two ministers. It 
is widely acknowledged that the Forum was the brainchild of the Women’s Coalition 
Party which pressed for a civil society contribution to any new political dispensation 
as part of the negotiations which led to the Agreement. Arrangements for the Forum 
were formalised in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 which requires the First and Deputy 
First Ministers, acting jointly, to make arrangements for obtaining from the Forum its 
views on social, economic and cultural matters. It is made up of 60 members drawn 
from a variety of sectors, all of whom are appointed, following a selection process, by 
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the First and Deputy First Minister
4
. Its informational literature describes it as 
representing a ‘broad cut of civic society in Northern Ireland’. The Forum held its 
inaugural meeting in October 2000. Its work programme falls into 3 broad categories: 
responding to major consultation exercises; research and analysis of key social, 
economic and cultural issues; and business improvement measures. Significantly, its 
views were sought on the Executive’s Programme for Government and the budget for 
2002/03. The Forum has also made submissions on a number of current policy 
debates – ‘Investing for Health Strategy’, the ‘Review of Post Primary Education’ and 
‘Priorities for Social Inclusion’. Its research and analysis team is considering a 
number of projects including work on: life-long learning, entrepreneurship and 
creativity; combating poverty; inclusiveness and a plural society; and creating a 
sustainable Northern Ireland. Business improvement measures are concerned with 
how the Forum can improve its effectiveness as an organisation (communication 
strategy, Civic Forum procedures and monitoring the impact of its work).   
 
Although early days, reactions to the Civic Forum thus far have been mixed. McCall 
and Williamson argue that the Forum ‘has the potential to offer civil society in 
Northern Ireland, particularly the voluntary and community sector, the opportunity to 
engage formally with the new democracy in a participative, consultative, and perhaps 
even deliberative capacity’ (McCall and Williamson, 2001: 369). They suggest that 
the attitude of MLA's and the inclusiveness and sectoral representation of the Forum 
will determine whether it ultimately enhances democracy in Northern Ireland. 
Broadly, pro-Agreement parties are supportive, or in the case of the UUP, prepared to 
delay judgement on its performance. Anti-Agreement parties, such as the DUP, are 
highly critical – describing it variously as ‘an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy’ or 
more scathingly ‘a monster quango’ (Hansard 25th September, 2000 and 14th 
September, 1998 respectively). The Party attempted to veto the operation of the 
Forum by insisting that the Assembly approve any matters which it sought to address, 
in effect to control its agenda. The Forum itself does not want to be seen as an 
organisation which simply reacts to issues as they arise through government 
consultation processes, or as Woods has pointed out: 
 
 The value and success of the Forum will depend on rising to the challenge of 
doing something different, and going well beyond commenting on proposals 
drawn up by others. Offering opinions is not participation in governance. 
Rather, offering solutions to problems, together with a commitment to help 
deliver those solutions, is what ministers should reasonably expect in return 
for putting their faith in a Civic Forum (Woods, 2001: 84). 
 
Thus far, however, it has failed to capture public interest. One Forum member has 
argued that it has not addressed the hard political and social issues, claiming it is 
overrun by enthusiasts of the Belfast Agreement. At its launch he suggests ‘the Civic 
Forum was accused of being a talking shop. It is in grave danger of becoming less 
than that’ (McConaghie, 2001: 4). Anti-Agreement MLA Peter Weir has cited 
resignations from the Forum and poor attendance by its participants (around 50%) as 
                                                          
4
 The Forum comprises members from: business (7); agriculture & fisheries (3); trade unions (7); 
voluntary and community sector (18); churches (5); culture (4); arts and sport (4); victims (2); 
community relations (2); education (2); appointees of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister 
(6); and an independent chair. 
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evidence of its moribund status (Hansard 9
th
 August 2002). This type of political 
criticism however, is described as ‘residual jealously towards the Forum on the part of 
some Assembly members which ignores, the very significant contributions made to 
the Executive’s Programme for Government’ (Wilford and Wilson, 2001: 59). Thus 
far, there appears to be limited interaction and exchange with other civic fora – the 
Scottish Civic Forum, the London Civic Forum and the long-standing Republic of 
Ireland’s National Economic and Social Forum. 
 
Local Strategy Partnerships 
 
Northern Ireland, like other parts of Europe, has embraced partnership arrangements 
mainly in areas of economic development, health, urban regeneration and peace and 
reconciliation. Initiatives such as ‘Making Belfast Work’, the ‘Derry/Londonderry 
Initiative’ were launched in the late 1980's in response to problems of multiple 
deprivation – physical dereliction, social deprivation, high long-term unemployment 
and difficulties attracting private sector investment into the cities. Partnership 
working through voluntary/community organisations, the private sector and 
Government became the norm as an integrated strategy evolved to tackle these deep-
rooted problems. European funds, however, institutionalised the model of partnership 
working in Northern Ireland. EU Community Initiatives such as URBAN have 
assisted local partnerships in deprived urban areas to support schemes for economic, 
social revitalisation and environmental protection. The INTERREG cross-border 
programme has funded projects aimed at strengthening economic and social cohesion 
by promoting cross-border transnational and interregional co-operation and balanced 
development – local authority cross-border (between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland) partnerships have been central to this Community Initiative.  
 
The European Union Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 
launched in 1995 (PEACE I: 1995-99), however, promoted partnership working to a 
new level. The aim of the programme was to support social inclusion of those at the 
margins of economic and social life, and exploit opportunities arising from the peace 
process in order to stimulate social and economic regeneration. One of the most 
innovative aspects of the programme was the development of 26 district partnerships 
coterminous with local authorities with responsibility for some 15% of the total 
funding package (£375m). Partnership boards were established from 3 sectors – one-
third councillors, one-third voluntary and community sector representatives, and one-
third made up from other partners – business, trade unions and statutory organisations 
(in equal numbers). Williamson et al (2000: 61) argued that district peace partnerships 
have given the voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland ‘a more central 
role in regard to issues of local development and regeneration than any of the 
European Union’s partnership initiatives in other countries’. The partnership approach 
was considered important beyond the confines of the individual funded projects. The 
process of partnership working cut across traditional political cleavages and fostered 
cross-sectoral working relations. Commenting on their effectiveness in this regard, 
Hughes et al note: 
 
 The European Peace and Reconciliation Initiative has opened up participation 
and partnership in a way that has recast democracy towards a model that 
brings together participatory and representative models. Their lead role 
confirms the value of local partnerships as a permanent feature of civic culture 
in the region, not least because of their enormous potential to make a lasting 
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contribution to peace and reconciliation in a divided society (Hughes et al, 
1998: 232). 
 
PEACE II (2000 – 2004) carries forward the overall aim of its predecessor but with a 
new economic focus. District partnerships have been replaced by Local Strategy 
Partnerships which are responsible for locally based regeneration and development 
strategies, addressing grassroots needs with local delivery mechanisms. The 
partnerships (again based on the 26 council areas) have been reconfigured and 
comprise two equal strands: local government and the main statutory bodies; and the 
four pillars of the social partners – private sector, trade unions, voluntary and 
community sector, and agricultural and rural development. They have been allocated 
20% of a Є595m funding package (under Priority 3 – PEACE II) to deliver local 
economic initiatives for developing the social economy, and human resources, 
training and development strategies. 
 
Beyond their role in delivering PEACE II, however, local strategy partnerships are 
expected to engage in integrated planning within district council areas. In other words, 
they must ensure that services provided to the public are better integrated across 
administrative boundaries and more responsive to the needs of local communities. 
Guidelines for the partnerships suggest ‘this is a process for agencies, stakeholders, 
communities, local councillors and individuals to engage in collaborative decision 
making about tackling key issues – jobs, education, health, crime and so on – for local 
people’ (Special EU Programmes Body, 2001: 6). To do this, the partnerships have 
been tasked to develop a local area strategy and action plan that will become the 
framework for sustainable regeneration and development in each district council area 
beyond the lifetime of PEACE II. This local integrated strategy ‘will seek to improve 
the economic, social and environmental conditions in a local area and contribute to 
sustainable development’ (Special EU Programme Body, 2001: 8).   
 
The obvious comparison here is with local strategic partnerships in England and 
Wales which provide a co-ordination framework to: prepare and implement a 
community strategy for the area; bring together local plans, partnerships and 
initiatives; work with local authorities that are developing a local public service 
agreement; and develop and deliver a local neighbourhood renewal strategy (DETR: 
2001(b): 5-6). In England and Wales there is now a statutory duty on local authorities 
to prepare community strategies to improve the economic, social and environmental 
well-being of their area and its inhabitants. Local strategic partnerships will be 
involved as part of the community planning process in their preparation, but the 
ultimate statutory responsibility (under the Local Government Act 2000) rests with 
councils. This is not the case in Northern Ireland where this role has been assumed by 
local partnerships in a non-statutory capacity. 
 
There is also enthusiasm from some influential figures to embed partnerships in the 
long-term governance of Northern Ireland. The Deputy First Minister (Mark Durkan) 
suggested in an Assembly debate: 
 
 Partnerships will have a vision and purpose which will last well beyond the 
horizons of the PEACE II programme…. In the context of the new institutions, 
I see an opportunity for the partnership process to be widened and deepened at 
both regional and local level. We do not want the partnership approach to be 
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confined to European funding, nor do we want it to wither away when that 
source of income has ceased. The whole purpose of our approach is to increase 
the scope and significance of decision-making at the local level (Durkan: 
2001: 16). 
 
Interestingly, Taylor (1997) in her earlier work on partnerships in Great Britain 
argued that they were ‘not a quick fix but had potential to be the basis for new forms 
of local governance that will last into the next century’. To do this, she argued that 
partnerships ‘cannot be tacked onto the edges of existing systems’. The Deputy First 
Minister seems intent on mainstreaming partnership governance in Northern Ireland 
and, as a result, challenges the future role of local government.  
 
 
The twin track approach - tensions 
 
The devolved government’s strategy for democratic renewal in Northern Ireland has 
been examined through two key approaches contained within the Executive’s 
Programme for Government: the recently launched review of public administration 
aimed at rejuvenating representative democracy weakened by Direct Rule, and a 
series of measures to strengthen participative democracy by collaborating with the 
voluntary and community sector.  A number of tensions are apparent in this quest for 
democratic renewal. Given the exclusion of government departments from the review 
of public administration, the focus of political and media attention thus far is on 
reducing the number of councils, democratising existing quangos or centralising their 
functions within the purview of the Assembly. Notwithstanding reference in the 
review to principles such as subsidiarity and community responsiveness, senior 
officials in the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister do not appear predisposed 
to a stronger local government in Northern Ireland under a reformed system. 
Similarly, although there is a significant local government presence in the Assembly 
(55% of Assembly members are local councillors: n = 60), MLA's have thus far 
appeared, at best, ambivalent towards local government. Even the most resolute anti-
Agreement MLA's have experienced the political clout they can exercise in discharge 
of major public services, denied for almost 30 years, and the trappings of power 
associated with holding office. This is more likely to result in centripetal tendencies 
than subsidiarity. The lavish surrounds of Parliament Buildings, a full-time salary and 
administrative support compare favourably to administering minor town hall 
functions on a voluntary basis. 
 
The debate on the distribution of powers is also informed by a long-standing distrust 
of local government by Nationalist and Republican politicians. The legacy of abuses 
by councils and the voluntary commitment to power-sharing at local level do not 
equate to statutory consociational arrangements at central government level 
established in the Belfast Agreement - coalition executive, proportionality in 
committees and cross-community voting arrangements for key decisions (O’Leary, 
1999).  These safeguards are more likely to result in Nationalists and Republicans 
favouring services delivered by Stormont departments. Edwards et al (2001: 307) 
describe the potential of partnerships to break ‘the centrifugally powerful association 
of local government and territory and impose a scalar and spatial division of 
government more consistent with the interests of the central state’, or, in this case, 
Nationalist and Republican interests at the centre (Stormont). The ‘well-being’ role 
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with which local strategy partnerships have been tasked and the strong support for 
their continuance beyond PEACE II, from the SDLP Deputy First Minister, 
institutionalises this more inclusive forum at the expense of local government. 
Democratic renewal in this case means increasing support at the local level for 
participative over representative forms of governance.   
 
Similar political tensions are evident in the devolved government’s relationship with 
the voluntary and community sector. On the one hand the Partners for Change 
strategy provides the sector with, according to civil servants, ‘unprecedented’ access 
and influence over departmental policy-making and accountability arrangements back 
to Joint Forum (comprising officials and voluntary and community sector 
representatives). On the other hand, the formal institutional arrangements for 
consulting social partners (the Civic Forum – on which the voluntary and community 
sector has 30% membership) is castigated by some political parties (in particular the 
DUP). Ironically, the Minister for the department which has championed the Partners 
for Change Strategy (Department for Social Development) is Nigel Dodds 
(Democratic Unionist Party, MP MLA). This may well be an objection based on 
principle. The Civic Forum is a construct of the Belfast Agreement which is 
strenuously opposed by the DUP. In the wider Unionist ‘family’, however, there are 
long-held suspicions of the voluntary and community sector. The hegemonic Unionist 
State (1921-72) produced a self-help culture amongst Nationalist and Republicans and 
a corresponding reliance by Unionists and Loyalists on a benevolent public sector. 
Things have changed significantly since the 1970's. A highly mobilised voluntary and 
community sector in Republican areas has led to accusations that Catholics secure a 
disproportionate amount of grant-aid (particularly from European funding) compared 
to Protestant areas lacking in social capital. Even where community ‘leaders’ emerge 
in Protestant areas, there is a lack of mutual trust at the grassroots level and a 
perceived inability in their capacity to represent the disparate factions within 
Unionism/Loyalism (Purdue, 2001). Sinn Féin’s community politics has been 
influential in the sector’s development and hence Unionists are wary of what they 
would see as an assertive Republican element with political aspirations well beyond 
their nominal brief.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Returning to Pratchett's (1999) framework offers a means of evaluating the extent of 
democratic renewal in Northern Ireland. He suggested three components ranging from 
practical responses to address problems of local democracy, to a reassessment of the 
role and purpose of local government, through to a more radical mode of democracy. 
The latter involves: 
  
A new democratic polity which not only improves the effectiveness of existing 
practices but also draws upon different components of direct, consultative, 
deliberative and representative democracy to create a new democratic order. 
The point is not that some of these components contribute more to democracy 
than others. Rather, it is the successful combination of them that makes for the 
new mode of democracy which the renewal process offers (Pratchett, 1999:9). 
 
In the case of Northern Ireland, the review of the role of local government, enhanced 
long-term involvement of local strategy partnerships, and the direct participation of 
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the voluntary and community sector in departmental decision-making across 
Government would suggest a ‘new democratic polity’, although the tensions are 
clearly showing. 
 
In general terms, some politicians are envious of the privileged access which the 
voluntary and community sector had to senior civil servants during the period of 
Direct Rule – as one Ulster Unionist MLA put it ‘it is time for the sector to stand 
aside’ (Cobain, quoted in McCall and Williamson, 2001). Yet at the same time, there 
is an acknowledgement of the valuable contribution which the sector can make to 
democratic renewal. Elite political consensus in the form of the Belfast Agreement 
cannot, of itself, deliver stability on the ground and requires active engagement with 
civil society as key stakeholders in the community (Byrne, 2001).  Where that 
engagement can take place at the level of a departmental strategy for collaboration 
(e.g. Partners for Change), it offers the potential for a constructive working 
relationship. When it enters the arena of ‘high politics’ and the mechanism for 
engagement is part of the architecture of the Belfast Agreement (e.g. the Civic 
Forum), then support is partial. Democratic renewal in Northern Ireland, as in the rest 
of the United Kingdom, is about responding to, and providing leadership for, local 
communities. The fact that those communities are fractured and increasingly polarised 
means that progress on renewal may be differential, given their starting positions. 
There is also a balance to be achieved in ensuring accountable forms of representative 
government sit alongside participative mechanisms for civic engagement. In a society 
still deeply divided along traditional ethno-national cleavages, cross-cutting sectoral 
contributions from social partners can act as an effective counterbalance. Achieving 
the optimal balance between participative and representative democracy is the task 
which faces the Northern Ireland Executive as it reviews the future role of local 
government and the relationship with its ‘partners’ in the form of the voluntary and 
community sector.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
TABLE 1: PARTY VOTING IN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS BY RELIGION 
 
 Religion 
Voting in the Assembly elections Catholic % Protestant % No religion % 
Unionists and Loyalists 2 91 41 
Nationalists and Republicans 92 2 32 
Other Parties 6 7 27 
N = 1046
5
 452 538 56 
 
Chi Square: 2   = 885.6   
Significance: p< .01  
Correlation: Cramer’s V = 0.65 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: LIKELIHOOD OF INFLUENCING LOCAL GOVT. BY RELIGION 
 
 Religion 
Able to influence local government
6
 Catholic % Protestant % No religion % 
Very & somewhat likely  22 20 18 
Not &  not at all likely  78 80 82 
N = 1142
7
 444 578 120 
 
Chi Square: 2   = 0.90   
Significance: p>.05 
Correlation: Cramer’s V = .03 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: PUBLIC VOICE VIA THE ASSEMBLY BY RELIGION 
 
 Religion 
Impact of Northern Ireland Assembly
8
 Catholic % Protestant % No Religion % 
More say in how NI is governed 54 33 43 
Less say 4 13 9 
Is making no difference 42 54 48 
N = 1583
9
 626 811 146 
 
Chi Square: 2   = 82.2 
Significance: p< .01  
Correlation: Cramer’s V = 0.16 
 
                                                          
5
 Excludes ‘don’t knows, did not vote and refused to disclose’. 
6
 Question posed in survey: ‘Suppose you wanted the local government to bring about some 
improvement in your local community. How likely is it that you would be able to do something about 
it?’ 
7
 Excludes ‘don’t knows’. 
8
 Question posed in survey: ‘From what you have seen and heard so far, do you think that having a 
Northern Ireland Assembly is giving ordinary people more say in how Northern Ireland is governed, 
less say or is it making no difference?’ 
9
 Excludes ‘don’t knows’.  
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